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COMMENTS
thereon. The importance of this question lies in the substantial
advantages of having one's name freed from accusation" and in
the provision of Article 9 that any prosecution which is so pre-
scribed may be dismissed and may not thereafter be revived.
GORDON L. RICHEY
DEFAMATION-CONDITIONAL PRIVILEGE IN LOUISIANA
It
The Louisiana law of defamation springs from Article 2315
of the Louisiana Civil Code, which provides:
"Every act whatever of man which causes an injury to another,
shall oblige him by whose fault it happened to repair it...
Despite the obvious leeway which this article gives the court,
the Louisiana courts have developed a law of defamation closely
resembling that of common law jurisdictions.
In Louisiana, when the defendant has defamed the social,
business, or moral interests or character of another, he is liable
to the injured party without further proof of damage or bad faith.2
If, however, he can show that the occasion was one in which the
value to society that the communication be made was great
enough to justify the damage caused, the law allows a privilege
to the publisher, relieving him entirely from civil liability.
These privileges are of two types-absolute and conditional.
An absolute privilege exists in certain situations where the
public interest in unhampered freedom of speech is so strong
that the courts feel that no liability should be imposed under any
circumstances. This privilege is limited to judges, legislators,
and certain executives acting in their respective official capacities.
fn other situations the courts grant only limited protection to the
35. For one of these advantages, see State v. Gunter, 188 La. 314, 177 So.
60 (1937).
tThis is the first of two installments on this subject. Included are the
privileges to defame for self protection, for common interest, for the protec-
tion of a third party, and for the protection of the recipient. The privilege
of fair comment, the privilege to defame for the protection of the public,
together with the topic of abuse of the conditional privilege to defame will be
dealt with in the concluding installment of this comment which will be pub-
lished in the forthcoming issue of the Louisiana Law Review.
1. Art. 2315, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. Miller v. Holstein, 16 La. 389 (1839); Sotorno v. Fourichon, 40 La. Ann.
423, 4 So. 71 (1888); Fellman v, Dreyfous, 47 La. Ann. 907, 17 So. 422 (1895).
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defendant. While recognizing the social value of allowing him to
make what would otherwise be defamatory statements, they
nevertheless are unwilling to accord him an indefeasible privilege
and they prefer to determine in each instance whether his con-
duct has been excessive. In such cases the term conditional priv-
ilege is employed. This conditional privilege may be defeated if
the communication was made with knowledge of its falsity or if
it was made under circumstances showing that the defendant
was prompted by an improper motive.
It is the purpose of this comment to point out the nature
and extent of the conditional privilege in Louisiana.
Self Protection
It is established that every man is privileged to defame
another in protection of some substantial interest in his own
social or economic welfare. It must appear not only that the
communication was necessary for his protection, but also that
the publisher reasonably believed the recipient to be in a position
to help him.
There must be some legal connection between the defendant's
statement and the interest which he seeks to protect. A person
cannot, under the guise of protecting his own business defame
another who has in no way injured or threatened to injure him.
Thus a privilege was denied where defendant sent a circular letter
to his patrons asking that they "show no favors" to plaintiff, a
former employee of defendant who was then in the employ of
another concern engaged in the same type of business.3 The
letter contained implications that plaintiff had been discharged
for some unexplained reason. The latter had in no way repre-
sented that he was still in the employ of the defendant, nor had
he otherwise attempted to cheat or defraud him. The case of
Mielly v. Soule4 affords an illustration of a situation where the
court felt that there was sufficient connection between the act
complained of and the defamatory statement. In that case
plaintiff business college had published a circular letter setting
forth many claims of its own superiority of instruction methods
and facilities. In this letter, defendant's business school had
been greatly ridiculed. Defendant, in retaliation, published a
small pamphlet which might be regarded as defamatory of
plaintiff. The court held that defendant's action was privileged,
3. Warner v. Clark, 45 La. Ann. 863, 13 So. 203 (1893).
4. 49 La. Ann. 800, 21 So. 593 (1897),
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being only a proper retaliatory measure made for the security of
his business.5
An employer has been held privileged to make reasonable
investigations of employees or customers who are suspected of
theft,5 forgeryJ or other dishonest actions in connection with the
defendant's business. In the case of Gilliland v. Feibleman' the
plaintiff alleged that defendant had publicly accused her of
stealing three yards of dress material while employed in the
store in which defendant was manager. The court, after finding
that the investigation had been conducted in a quiet and orderly
manner, said:
"It is properly and peculiarly the duty of the responsible or
directing head of any business to question its employees
regarding the property of the concern or the conduct of its
affairs."
A person is also privileged to defend himself from a slander-
ous attack made against his personal character."0 The common
law qualifies this privilege by saying that the statement must
be made reasonably and without malice." Louisiana courts how-
ever have uniformly refused to allow recovery by either party
in cases of mutual abuse. The rule was well stated by the court
in Kenner v. Miller:2
"The principle seems to be well embedded in our jurisprudence
that in suits of this kind where the parties have engaged in
mutual vituperation and abuse at each other, they are both
wrong, and neither can recover from the other."
Protection of Common Interest
An occasion is conditionally privileged when the publisher
and the recipient have a common interest which will be protected
or furthered by the communication. Again, the interest must be
5. It appears in the case that the court was not satisfied that defendant's
remarks were actually defamatory of plaintiff. The decision, however, was
based upon both grounds.
6. Gilliland v. Feibleman's Inc., 161 La. 24, 108 So. 112 (1926).
7. Raggio v. Morgan's Louisiana and Texas R. & S. S. Co., 148 La. 209,
86 So. 747 (1920).
8. 161 La. 24, 108 So. 112 (1926).
9. 161 La. 24, 27, 108 So. 112, 113 (1926). A similar privilege has been
accorded when the defendant has defamed in 'defense of the quality of his
product. Lynch v. Febiger, 39 La. Ann. 336, 1 So. 690 (1887).
10. Bloom v. Crescioni, 109 La. 667, 33 So. 724 (1903).
11. Preston v. Hobbs, 161 App. Div. 363, 146 N.Y. Supp. 419 (1914); Craig
v. Wright, 182 Okla. 68, 76 P. (2d) 248 (1938); Wettach, Recent Developments
in Newspaper Libel (1928) 13 Minn. L. Rev. 21, 31-34,
12. 196 So. 535, 537 (La. App. 1940).
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substantial, and the publisher must believe that the recipient is
a proper party to receive the publication. In the case of Oakes v.
Walther18 the supreme court approved the rule as stated by
Newell:
"A communication made in good faith, upon any subject
matter in which the party has an interest or in reference to
which he has a duty, either legal, moral or social, if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty, is qualifiedly
privileged.""
In that case defendant, a physician, examined plaintiff at the
request of certain attorneys employed in litigation to which
plaintiff was a party. The defendant's unfavorable report of the
plaintiff's mental condition to the attorneys was held to be
privileged.
This privilege of protection of a common interest is most
commonly used where the interest is of a business or financial
nature. It has been extended however to include cases in which
interests of a non-pecuniary nature are involved. For example,
in Berot v. Porte,15 where plaintiff had applied for membership
members that plaintiff was of Negro blood. In other cases, a
defendant has been held privileged to make derogatory state-
ments of plaintiff to the sister-in-law who was caring for defen-
dant's child where the statements concerned the child's welfare.16
Similarly a mother has been held privileged to address the
principal of a public school concerning the moral fitness of her
child's instructor.17
Protection of Third Persons
In the two situations last discussed the court might with
equal ease have found that the defamatory statements made to
the sister-in-law or school principal were for the protection of a
third person, the defendant's child, in whom the defendant had
a proper family interest. It is generally held that one member
of a family group may make defamatory statements to third
persons for the protection of another member of the family. The
interest protected here may be the general welfare of the other
family member, as in the cases last cited. Also the statement
may be made for the protection of some specific financial interest
of the family member, as in Haney v. Trost. 8 In this latter case
13. 179 La. 365, 154 So. 26 (1934).
14. Newell, Slander and Libel (3 ed. 1914) 479.
15. 144 La. 805, 81 So. 323 (1919).
16. State v. Lambert, 188 La. 968, 178 So. 508 (1938),
17. Simms v. Clark, 194 So. 123 (L. App. 1940),
18. 34 La. Ann. 1146 (1882).
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a husband was held privileged to address statements defamatory
of the plaintiff to the head of a company in which his wife was a
stockholder. Where the third person whose interest the defendant
seeks to protect is not related to the defendant, the latter may
still be privileged to defame for the protection of such person.
In these cases, however, the courts attempt to exclude the officious
intermeddler. For this reason it is important to determine
whether or not the information was given in response to an
inquiry by some person having a legitimate interest in the matter.
In the case of Buisson v. Huard"9 relatives of a lady who was
engaged to be married to the plaintiff approached the defendant
and inquired of him concerning the plaintiff's character. The
alleged defamatory statements which were made in good faith
in response to this inquiry were held to be privileged. If the
defendant had volunteered the statements it is doubtful that the
court would have accorded him the protection of privilege.
Protection of the Recipient
The problem is similar where a defamatory remark is made
for the purpose of protecting some interest of the person to
whom the remark is addressed. In the case of McBride v.
Ledoux20 it was held that one member of a family was privileged
to make derogatory statements to another member of the family
group concerning the latter's suitor. Here again the family rela-
tionship affords a substantial guarantee that the defendant is
not an intermeddler.
A similar situation is presented by statements made by
mercantile agencies to subscribing members. Generally speaking,
a mercantile agency is not privileged to issue a scandalous report
merely for the reason that the publication of such a report is in
the general financial interests of its subscribers.2 1 However, if
the report is made in response to a special request by a subscriber
and is not generally circulated the court may regard it as a
privileged communication.22
MARTHA E. KIRK
MORRIS D. ROSENTHAL*
19. 106 La. 768, 31 So. 293 (1901).
20. 111 La. 398, 35 So. 615 (1904).
21. Glacona & Son v. The Bradstreet Co., 48 La. Ann. 1191 (1896).
22. For a more detailed discussion of this problem see Note (1941) 4
LOUiISANA LAW Rizviaw 140.
*A substantial part of the research work which led to the preparation
of this comment was done by Mr. Rosenthal as a research project in the
Torts course at Louisiana State University. Mr. Rosenthal served as a mem-
ber of the armed forces and has been missing in action since December 13,
1944.
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